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Defining South-Eastern Europe
George Schöpflin
1 The question of South-Eastern Europe raises the central difficulty of definitions. How is
an area or topic to be defined in such a way that it has consistently valid characteristics
and the  area  so  defined is  distinct  from others ?  This  requires  the  establishment  of
boundaries,  which  both  include  and  exclude  and,  correspondingly  empower  and
disempower. But that is only one half of the problem. The other is to identify the shared
structures that define the area. This point is crucial. Structures are universal, while the
content may be quite diverse. Many people are misled by this polarity between structure
and content. They look at the content and conclude that what they are seeing is unique.
In  a  way they are,  indeed,  unique,  but  the  underlying structure  makes  comparisons
possible. That in turn means that in any attempt at defining an area, in our case South-
Eastern Europe, we must first seek to identify the structures that are shared. That is what
makes comparative work possible and legitimate and, at the same time, demarcates the
area from others. Indeed, this identification of the structure is vital. Without doing so, we
can easily become captives of our own data and end up collecting piles of fascinating but
trivial information that we are unable to contextualise.
2 Let us look next at the problematic of South-Eastern Europe. How are we to define an
area, or a community ? It must have certain shared characteristics, notably established
boundaries,  geographical and non-geographical,  that are recognised and recognisable,
but geography on its own is not sufficient - geography is not destiny. Indeed, in many
ways looking at a map and seeing a certain geographical unity is misleading, in as much
as a map is no more than a representation, a scientific metaphor for physical and other
realities. There is a clear tendency in a certain range of historical and political analysis to
assume without further scrutiny that geographical unity must also involve other kinds of
unity. It is vital, therefore, in defining an area that all shared characteristics, not just
geographical - let alone cartographical - boundaries be assessed.
3 In order that these boundaries be regarded as real, they must include and exclude and
must empower and disempower. Then, the greater the number and variety of overlapping
and mutually  reinforcing boundaries,  the  better  they will  resist  penetration and the
Defining South-Eastern Europe
Balkanologie, Vol. III, n°2 | 2008
1
stronger will be the identity that it contains. Thus the more powerful the boundary, the
more successful it will be in creating an internal coherence - a process that takes place in
continuous interaction with the boundary and the boundary traffic from outside. This is
the sense in which geographical definitions on their own say very little ; there must be
cultural,  historical,  linguistic,  administrative,  political  boundaries  functioning
cumulatively to establish lines that are very difficult to cross. Time-processes operating
over time generate recognisable patterns, a longue durée, by making these processes a part
of what the community comes to regard as “normal and natural”, as a part of its world of
implicit assumptions. Overall, communities within such boundaries acquire shared habits
in  their  ways  of  life,  shared  ways  of  solving  problems,  defining  strategies  and
understanding experiences. They acquire membership of a shared web of meanings and
reproduce  the  shared  thought-styles  and  thought-worlds  that  are  built  upon  these
processes.  These  are  real  communities,  with  well  established  qualities  that  are
continuously reproduced and giving rise to cultural norms.
4 Cultural norms establish a set of rebuttable presumptions often encoded in the implicit
world of doxa, the cultural grain. These norms are not absolute and not deterministic, it
is always possible to go against them, but that makes matters harder, it is more difficult
to legitimate ideas if they are deviant in terms of established cultural norms and the
potential to revert to the status quo ante if  innovations go against the grain is high.
Change imposed against the grain of cultural community will certainly change it, the act
of resistance produces change, but the imposed change will always be seen as alien, as
abnormal. At most what will emerge is something hybrid and hybridised. This, after all,
was the outcome of the communist experience.
5 The  Enlightenment  state,  the  modern  rational  and  rationalising  state,  is  an
extraordinarily  powerful instrument.  It  has  the  capacity  to  create  order,  meaning,
security amidst ever greater complexity and at best it can generate good governance,
transparency and accountability. It can integrate social and political action to prevent it
from creating chaos or degenerating into anomie, while simultaneously making provision
for individual choice. It exists as a concrete reality and as symbol, particularly in its ideal-
typical form. 
6 It  was in this form that it  was exported to South-Eastern Europe.  This is  significant,
because it means that it had its origins and contours in a different cultural matrix, a
culture with different cultural capital. Hence it was received in the region in a complete
form and had to compete against the local  pre-existing thought-worlds and thought-
styles. The two have been at odds ever since. The fit between the modern state and the
varieties of the South-East European thought-style has never been a good one, though
that has not prevented the South-East European polities from retaining the aspiration to
enrooting the modern state in its received Western form.
7 What, then, are the tensions ? First, the reciprocity of rights between rulers and ruled, a
very deeply encoded pattern under Western Christianity and feudalism,  establishes a
counterfoil to the bureaucratic norms of the modern state, which is predisposed to see
itself  as  the  repository  of  ultimate  rationality.  Alternative  perspectives,  alternative
rationalities  are  vital  in  ensuring  that  the  state  does  not  become the  captive  of  its
bureaucratic norms and be ensnared by them. Reciprocity here means feedback and self-
limitation. None of these is well established in South-Eastern Europe. If anything, the
state continues to be seen as the key agent of transformation, possibly even the pre-
eminent agent of transformation.
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8 Then,  in  South-Eastern  Europe  the  complexity  of  social  structures  is  not  matched
intellectually, cognitively or semantically by society and social knowledge. Modernity was
taken over by the state rather than by the society that had still to be modernised when
the  reception  occurred,  leaving  the  state  the  primary  agent  of  modernisation  in  a
dominant position over society, thereby reproducing the problem, because society finds it
difficult to take on the state with inadequate information and social knowledge. The state
assumes control of modernisation, because it sees itself as supremely rational and seeks
to transform society in its own image. Communism was the apotheosis of this. But society
resists this, because it does not necessarily accept the vision of the state as its own. The
outcome  is  an  uneasy  hybrid,  with  contrasting  and  contradictory  aspirations  and
thought-styles in conflict. All of this gives modernisation a bad name, a teleological and
alien  quality,  something  programmatic  over  which  society  has  little  control.  The
consequence is passivity and not the civil society upon which the democratic state is
predicated. In this sense, modernisation from above becomes a moral issue.
9 Third,  this  means  that  the  legacy  of  the  pre-modern  networks  of  power  becomes
significant  in  understanding  South-Eastern  Europe,  together  with  the  entire  cultural
capital of the region. The networks of power and the forms in which power was exercised,
the  style  of  public  pronouncements,  for  instance,  are  reshaped  by  the  coming  of
modernity, but they do not vanish entirely. The way in which power is exercised, notably
in the existence and authority of patron-client networks or the persistence of informal
regulation over formal, can bring about a subtle metamorphosis of institutions and make
them operate in ways not intended by their original founders.
10 Further,  there  is  the  problem  of  secularisation,  which  was  a  central  aspect  of
Enlightenment rationality, in that early modernity was defined against religion if it was
defined against anything ; but secularism has a very different resonance in non-Western
Christianity, where the secular sphere has never been as sharply differentiated as in the
West. Some of the cultural capital conserved from the pre-modern past in South-Eastern
Europe is  clearly  the  residue  of  religion and these  residues  are  different  from their
equivalents in the West.
11 The question then is, can there be a South-Eastern European model of modernity ? The
answer is yes, but it will have to be constructed on the basis of South-Eastern European
thought-styles  and  thought-worlds,  practices,  traditions  rather  than  by  a  mass
importation of ideas and patterns from elsewhere. If that means giving greater saliency to
ethnicity or hierarchy or whatever, so be it. The alternative will not work very well. The
key structures of modernity - complexity, change, contests for power - are the same as
anywhere else, but the South-East European content will be different from that of the
West.
12 In theorising the nature and quality of South-Eastern Europe as a whole, we should try to
identify the series of shared experiences, patterns and structures operating interactively,
generating particular types of collective meanings and cultural capital.
13 The area has had an experience of a particular type of imperial rule - different from the
West -  based on alien and unpredictable forms of  social  knowledge and power,  alien
patterns  of  exclusion  and  alien  legitimation.  Thus  the  Ottoman  legacy  tended  to
emphasise  timelessness,  changelessness,  the  futility  of  individual  endeavour,  and
centrally this mode of exercising and legitimating power lacked a model of far-reaching
change consonant with South-Eastern European expectations. Power was sacralised in an
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alien way. The modern state has been constructed against this legacy and necessarily
took on some of its features as contestants invariably do ; that opposition in turn became
the primary resource for the modern state and the coherence that it sought to create.
14 The system of administration created by the Ottoman imperium was highly oppressive
and arbitrary. It had no concept of a public sphere or public good. Taxation excluded all
reciprocity  and little  to  nothing was  returned to  those  who were  taxed.  It  was  also
inefficient. It gave the individual and the community minimal protection in terms of law
and policing and it was remote, opaque and non-responsible. The states constructed on
this legacy took over some, not all,  of these features and reproduced them. The local
élites that lived under this imperium were weak and the styles of power constructed then
live on in an attenuated form and are reproduced in modernity.
15 Peasant subsistence agriculture creates weak models of the future. All resources, non-
material as well as material, are treated as zero-sum, there is very little surplus given the
marginality of much of the land and the low level of skills, collective cultivation of the
land undermines individual initiative and the area suffered from remoteness from the
market.  Adult  illiteracy  was  widespread in  the  absence  of  a  religious  or  educational
tradition that stressed adult participation in either church or etatic institutions.
16 The area shares certain myth structures, notably the antemurale myth of being the last
bastion of the West against the East, the myth of victimhood and betrayal by “Europe”, a
mythic compensation for that suffering (Kosovo is the most obvious case in point), as well
as a myth of imperial oppression as justification for time lag and perceived backwardness.
17 Religion creates recognisable thought-worlds and thought-styles. Orthodoxy and Islam,
the dominant religions, interacted with Western Christianity directly and indirectly and
regarded themselves as threatened centres of moral virtue. Religion establishes a shared
world of rituals and cognitive norms, a particular conception of sacred time and sacred
space,  a  set  of  moral  regulations and sense of  order.  These bring their  own cultural
capital with them. The question is what kind of thought-style emerges from Orthodoxy
and  Islam ?  In  general,  these thought-styles  privilege  the  collective  over  individual
responsibility,  encode  a  strong  sense  of  hierarchy,  pronounce  non-negotiable  truth
claims,  offer  weak  cognitive  models  of  change  and  radical  rather  than  incremental
change, through the idea of redemption and salvation.
18 The strength or weakness of urbanisation is a key variable. The city functions as the locus
of continuous change and exchange, but in South-Eastern Europe it has been weak, static,
small and ruralised ; it seldom had the capacity to integrate the surrounding countryside.
Then,  the  South-Eastern  European  city  was  massively  ruralised  with  communist
modernisation,  something that  it  has  still  to  overcome.  Furthermore,  the communist
models of urban integration offered little or nothing to these newly arriving rural masses
that would allow them to weather the trauma of the rural-urban shift and to come to
terms with the dynamic diversity that the city creates. If anything, communism offered
counterproductive models, that of “ the classless communist man ”, which was static and
empty of content in the context of various forms of the real social stratification and
interactions that people encountered.
19 It is worth adding here that pre-modern models of ethnic coexistence in pre-modern
cities  like  Sarajevo,  say  nothing about  modern ones,  for  in  modernity  the  nature  of
power, of complexity, of resources, of contest are utterly different. There are many who
think otherwise, but this is idle dreaming. Where urban cognitive and behavioural models
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have existed, they were inadequate or swamped so that the city failed to emerge as a
locus of civility.
20 Finally,  why is  South-Eastern Europe different from Central  Europe,  why has Central
Europe proved more readily integrable into Western Europe than South-Eastern Europe ?
Some of the answers should follow from the foregoing. Central Europe has better state
capacity,  superior  ability  to  adjust  to  and  accommodate  post-  Enlightenment
requirements, its thought-worlds are closer to the Western European norm (because of
the legacy of Western Christianity) and is thus better able to cope with the diversity that
modernity  generates.  This  does  not  mean  that  Central  Europe  is  possessed  of  some
inherent virtue as some South-East Europeans occasionally suggest, but that the criteria
of  integration  were  established  in  the  West  and  Central  Europe,  despite  its  self-
characterisation of intermediacy, has been structurally closer to those Western criteria
than South-Eastern Europe.
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